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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the
State of Utah, by and through
Utah State Department of
Social Services,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

]
\

vs.

C a s e N o . 960367-CA

]

JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellee.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The above-entitled court has jurisdiction of this appeal
because it is an appeal from the district court involving domestic
relations, specifically child custody,

Utah Code Ann., Section 78-

2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1996).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The issues for review herein are as follows:
1.

Did the District

Court

abuse

its discretion in

imposing the sanction of striking Plaintiff Wright's (hereinafter
"Plaintiff") pleadings and entering

a Default

Judgment

against

Plaintiff?
2.

Did the District

Court

abuse

its discretion by

denying Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment?
The standard for review for a discretionary decision by
a trial court is that it should be reversed if the ruling is so
unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of
discretion.

Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Both issues herein were preserved by Plaintiff's Motion
for Relief from Order and Judgment filed with the Court on or about
May 2, 1996.
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37 is set forth in full in the

2.

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) is set forth in full in the

addendum.

addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
The instant matter was brought before the lower court by

a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce filed by Defendant, which
was responded to by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also filed a Counter-

Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.

The Petition to Modify

sought to change the custody of the parties' minor child
Plaintiff to Defendant.

from

The Counter Petition sought to increase

child support.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Defendant filed and served the Petition to Modify Decree

of Divorce in or about August 1995.

Plaintiff, by and through her

counsel of record, filed an answer to the Petition and CounterPetition on or about September 15, 1995.

On or about October 19,

1995, Defendant served Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests
to

Plaintiff,

which

constituted

various

requests for production of documents.

2

interrogatories

and

R. 181-85; 188-90; 197-98.

Before answering the requests for discovery, Plaintiff's
counsel withdrew on or about January 24, 1996.

On March 29, 1996,

Defendant filed a Motion to Strike "Answer to Petition to Modify
Decree

of

Divorce",

"Counter-Petition",

(hereinafter "Motion for Sanctions").

and

for

Judgment

Plaintiff did not respond to

the Motion and on April 23, 1996 the District Court entered an
Order Striking "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce",
and Striking "Counter-Petition" and Granting Judgment in Favor of
Defendant, which, inter alia, ordered a change of custody from

Plaintiff

to

Defendant

and dismissed

increased child support.

Plaintiff's

claims

for

R. 200; 213-15; 232-35.

On or about May 2, 1996, after obtaining new counsel,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment and
Motion for Stay and Request for Expedited Hearing and Decision.
The parties presented oral argument in the matter on May 15, 1996.
R. 270-71; 304.
D.

Disposition of the Court.
The lower court denied the motion of Plaintiff and on

June 7, 1996 entered an Ord^r formally denying the Motion for
Relief

from

Order

and

Judgment.

R.

317-18.

See

Course

of

Proceedings, above.
D.

Statement of Facts,
In or about August, 1995, Defendant filed and served a

Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce requesting, inter alia, a
change

of

custody

from

Plaintiff

to

Defendant.

Plaintiff

immediately obtained counsel, Michael W. Park, and filed a n Answer
3

to the Petition and a Counter Petition to increase child support on
or about September 15, 1995.

R. 181-85; 188-90.

On or about October 19, 1995, Defendant mailed and served
Defendant's First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, which
Plaintiff's attorney immediately mailed to Plaintiff. Likewise, on
or about October 31, 1995, Plaintiff's counsel served Plaintiff's
First

Set of

Interrogatories

and Production of Documents

upon

Defendant and a copy of those was mailed to Plaintiff as well.
After receiving copies of both the Defendant's and Plaintiff's
discovery requests, Plaintiff did not hear anything further from
her attorney and, based upon information Plaintiff had obtained
from others, that Defendant was having difficulty in his current
marriage, believed that the matter had been dropped.

Without

hearing further from her counsel, in late January, 1996, Plaintiff
received
shortly
Represent

a Notice of Withdrawal
thereafter
Self

received

from

counsel

a

of Counsel
Notice

for

to

from Mr. Park
Appoint

Defendant.

Counsel

Nothing

and
or

further

occurred until early April 1996 when Plaintiff received Defendant's
Motion for Sanctions.

R. 197-98; 199; 278-279.

Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Motion

for

Sanctions, Plaintiff contacted Mr. Park to determine whether he
would agree to reenter an appearance in her behalf.

When Plaintiff

was finally able to speak with Mr. Park, he advised her that, in
order for him to reenter the case, he would require a retainer,
which Plaintiff was unable to pay-

Mr. Park also suggested that

Plaintiff contact Utah Legal Services, who had earlier represented
4

Plaintiff in her divorce.

Plaintiff contacted Utah Legal Services

in Salt Lake City where she then resided, but was later advised to
contact the Cedar City office.

Plaintiff was finally able to

contact the Cedar City office of Utah Legal Services in mid-April.
On or about April 24, 1996, Plaintiff received a letter dated April
18, 1996 from Utah Legal Services advising her that although she
was financially eligible for its services, it would not be able to
handle her case.

Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff contacted her

present counsel, Floyd W Holm, who agreed to handle the case.

R.

279-80.
By the time Mr. Holm was able to receive Plaintiff's file
and review the matter, the lower court had already granted the
Motion

for

Sanctions

changing custody.

and

entered

judgment

against

Plaintiff

Plaintiff did file a timely Motion for Relief

from Judgment on the ground of excusable neglect, which was denied
by the lower court.

R. 270-71; 280; 317-18.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:
Plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery,

although

technically improper, did not sufficiently frustrate the ends of
justice to justify the lower court's striking her pleadings and
entering default judgment against her.

Such action by the lower

court constituted a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court,
POINT II;
Based upon Plaintiff's belief that the case had been
dropped, her difficulty in obtaining new counsel when the Motion of
5

Defendant was filed, and the lack of any affirmative or deliberate
attempts at frustrating prosecution of the case, the lower court
should have set aside the default judgment and allowed the matter
to proceed on its merits.

To not allow the action to proceed on

its merits, which is favored in the law, constituted an abuse of
discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS
A SANCTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if a party fails to timely respond to discovery requests such
as

those

made

by

Defendant

here/

he

can

move

the

court

for

sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2), including the sanction of
striking of pleadings and entering a default judgment against the
disobedient

party.

Utah

R.

Civ.

P.

37(b)(2)(C)

&

(d).

Furthermore, it is not necessary that the aggrieved party first
file a motion to compel discovery under Rule 37(a).

W.W. & W.B.

Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah
1977).
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ultimate sanction of
default judgment under the circumstances of Gardner.

Id. at 738.

The court, however, stated as follows:
The
extreme
sanction
of
default
or
dismissal must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that
its imposition is merited.... The sanction of
default judgment is justified where there has
been a frustration of the judicial process,
6

viz., where the
failure
to respond
to
discovery impedes trial on the merits and
makes it impossible to ascertain whether the
allegations of the answer have any factual
merit.
Id. (footnotes omitted)(citing Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr & Sons,
Inc., 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1973); Bollard v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 569, 582-585 (W.D. Mo. 1971)).
In Gardner, defendant was served with interrogatories in
October of 1975 and again in July and August of 1976.

Not until

having been seirved a Motion for Default Judgment did defendant
respond to the request on September 15, 1976, some ten and one-half
months after the first set of interrogatories was propounded.

In

addition, defendant had failed to answer requests for admissions or
to even request that they be withdrawn after the time for answering
them had passed.
represented

by

proceedings.

There is no evidence that the Defendant was not
competent

counsel

during

all

stages

of

the

X6L. at 736.

In Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), this court agreed that default judgment as a sanction for
discovery failures is a harsh remedy that "should be meted out with
caution", and despite grievous acts of delay and avoidance, upheld
the lower court's determination to set aside its earlier sanction
of default judgment for failure to comply with discovery.

In

Darrington,

an

despite

repeated

orders

compelling

discovery,

earlier default judgment which was set aside, failure to appear at
scheduled

depositions

and

other

uncooperative

acts

by

the

defendants, this court held that the lower court's setting aside
7

the default for a second time was not an abuse of discretion.

in

regard

as

to the tactics of the Defendant,

this court

stated

follows:
It has now been almost eight years since
Troy Darrington's injury first occurred in
this fairly straightforward personal injury
case. Despite the Plaintiff's dogged, albeit
sometimes overzealous, pursuit of a judgment,
Wades employed what appeared to be dilatory
tactics at every turn.
We
find such
litigation strategies most obnoxious.
For all the defendants knew, the case may
have been susceptible to a quick and easy
resolution in their favor. Regardless of how
the merits of the case may eventually be
resolved, however, if the defendants had
shouldered their obligation to face up to the
claims against them, and resolve the issue as
to their liability, the case could have been
concluded much sooner, thereby avoiding a
great deal of wasted time and expense.
If
litigants in every case acted 'as these have,
the justice system would quickly come to a
standstill.
Id. at 456 n. 2.
In the instant case, unlike Gardner, the Plaintiff was
not represented by counsel at the time the Motion for Sanctions was
made by Defendant.

Further, unlike Gardner, only slightly over

five months had passed since the request for discovery was first
propounded on Plaintiff.

In the meantime, at least to Plaintiff,

there was no meaningful activity in the case.

Indeed, Defendant

had not responded to the discovery propounded upon him less than
two weeks after the request for discovery from Plaintiff.

In this

case, their is not evidence of any dilatory tactics on the part of

8

Plaintiff to avoid answering discovery or delay the proceedings.1
Furthermore,

as more

thoroughly

discussed

below,

there

is

no

evidence of any meaningful frustration of the judicial process by
Plaintiff.

It is thus a clear abuse of discretion for the lower

court to impose the sanction of default judgment and dismissal of
the counter petition when this court in Darrington held that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside such a
sanction despite all of the allusive, uncooperative, dilatory and
obstructive tactics of the defendants there.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

BY

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party is entitled to relief from a judgment or order of the
court on the grounds of mistake or excusable neglect and it is "in
the furtherance of justice.11

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Generally,

the appellate courts of this state have held that default judgments
are disfavored and should be entered only rarely when circumstances
permit so that, "in the furtherance of justice", cases can be heard
on their merits.
Corp,

611 P.2d

Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development
369, 371

(Utah 1980);

Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d

Heathman v. Fabian and

189, 190 (1962); Mayhew v.

Standard Gilsonite Co,, 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962); Locke

•'•As will be discussed below, Plaintiff did not believe the
proceedings were being actively prosecuted until she received
Defendants Motion for Sanctions.
9

v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955); Darrington v.
Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The facts of Interstate Excavating are similar to those
at bar.
result

There, the lower court entered a default judgment as a
of

the

defendant's

failure

to

appear

at

trial.

The

defendant had originally been served with a summons and complaint
and its counsel filed an answer in response thereto.
conference,

counsel

for defendant

was allowed

At a pretrial

to withdraw

and

counsel for plaintiff was instructed to advise defendant of the
same so that it could obtain new counsel and appear at the trial
scheduled

some

three

weeks

later.

When

defendant

or

its

representative did not appear at the trial, the court entered a
default judgment against it. Upon learning of the default judgment
approximately
immediately

one week

filed

later,

defendant,

through

new

a motion to set aside the default

counsel,
judgment•

Defendant claimed that he had never received notice of the trial,
that some confusion may have been caused by the fact that its
former counsel had withdrawn from several cases simultaneously, and
the notice to appoint successor or appear in person and trial may
have

been

misplaced

Excavating,

611

P. 2d

with
at

numerous
370.

other

Based

papers.

upon

the

Interstate
above-stated

circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of
discretion for the lower court to deny the motion to set aside
default judgment and stated as follows:
It is not to be questioned that in
appropriate circumstances default judgments
are justified; and when they are, they are
invulnerable to attack. However, they are not
10

favored in the law, especially where a party
has
timely
responded
with
challenging
pleadings.
When that has been done some
caution should be observed to see that the
party is not taken advantage of.
Speaking
generally about such problems, it is to be
kept in mind that access to the court for the
protection of rights in the settlement of
disputes is one of the most important factors
in the maintenance of a peaceable and wellordered society. This of course must be done
in obedience to the rules; and it is to be
conceded that there is a possibility that the
defendant was less than diligent in attending
to its interest in this lawsuit.
But no
evidence was taken, nor did the court make any
findings
other
than
the
order
denying
defendant's motion.

The uniformly acknowledged policy of the
law is to accord litigants the opportunity for
a hearing on the merits, where that can be
done without serious injustice to the other
party. To that end the courts are generally
indulgent toward the setting aside of default
judgments
where
there
is
a
reasonable
justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure
to
appear,
and
where
timely
application is made to set it aside•
Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted).
In

the

instant

case,

as

in

Interstate,

Plaintiff's

counsel had withdrawn at the time the Motion for Sanctions was
filed.

Plaintiff has given a reasonable and justifiable excuse as

to why she neglected to answer the discovery:
the case to have been dropped.

That she believed

Also, as in Interstate, through her

counsel she had filed challenging pleadings.

As in Interstate, it

seems that Defendant was taking advantage of Plaintiff's lack of

11

counsel

and

thereby

preventing

Plaintiff

from

having

a

very

important issue of child custody determined on its merits.2
As in Interstate, the court did not take any evidence nor
did it make any findings other than to simply deny Plaintiff's
motion.3

Finally,

as in Interstate, to set aside the default

judgment would not have done any serious injustice to Defendant.
Now that Plaintiff had new counsel, the judge could have ordered
that she respond to the discovery within a time certain.
ten days would have been acceptable.

Then if Plaintiff failed to

respond, default judgment may be more appropriate.
had been set in the case.

Certainly

No trial date

Indeed, Defendant had not even responded

to Plaintiff's requests for discovery.

It is difficult to see any

injustice that could have resulted to Defendant to by setting aside
the default, let alone serious injustice.4

2

The priority classification of this case should be some
indication of the importance of the issues involved. Utah R. App.
P. 29(b).
3

Defendant may argue that default judgment was appropriate
because Plaintiff had wrongfully withheld visitation of the minor
child from Defendant.
However, the court had only the bald
allegations of Defendant's affidavit to substantiate this fact, and
Plaintiff was not allowed to present evidence to controvert the
affidavit. Of course, the matter of withheld visitation was one of
the key issues to be determined on the merits.
4

Again, Defendant' may argue that Defendant suffered serious
injustice because he had been denied visitation of his child;
however, Defendant was not without a remedy.
He could have
immediately filed order to show cause proceedings or a motion for
temporary order regarding custody, and such matters could have been
heard on the merits immediately. In fact, contemporaneous with his
Motion for Sanctions, Defendant requested and received an Order to
Show Cause on the issue of visitation. R. 221-27. Defendant could
have served and prosecuted the Order to Show Cause at any time.
12

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above discussion, this court should
reverse the order of the lower court entering default judgment and
dismissing the Counter Petition and/or the order denying the motion
to set aside default judgment. The matter should then be remanded
to the district court for disposition of the issues presented by
the Petition to Modify and Counter Petition on their merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this „ / ^ d a y of November, 1996.

^

^

^

FLOYD yW HOLM
Attcwney for Plaintiff-Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a two (2) true and correct
copies of the above arid foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Willard R.
Bishop, P.O. Box 279, 6330, Cedar City, UT 84720, this ^ ^ d a y of
November, 1996, first class postage fully prepaid.

13

A D D E N D U M

15

R u l e 37. F a i l u r e to m a k e or c o o p e r a t e in d i s c o v e r y ;
sanctions.
(a) M o t i o n for o r d e r c o m p e l l i n g d i s c o v e r y . A party,
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as
follows:
(1) A p p r o p r i a t e c o u r t . An application for an order to
a party may be made to the court in which the action is
pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the
court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
An application for an order to a deponent who is not a
party shall be made to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken.
(2) M o t i o n . If a deponent fails to answer a question
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 3 1 , or a
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer an
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted u n d e r Rule
34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. W h e n taking a
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the
question may complete or adjourn the examination before
he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may
make such protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) E v a s i v e or incomplete answer. For purposes of
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete answer is to be
treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of e x p e n s e s of motion. If t h e motion is
granted, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct
or both of them to pay to the moving party t h e reasonable
expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the
motion was substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the attorney
advising the motion or both of them to pay to the party or
deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless t h e court finds that the making of the
motion was substantially justified or t h a t other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the
court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a
just manner,
(b) F a i l u r e to c o m p l y w i t h o r d e r .
(1) S a n c t i o n s b y c o u r t in d i s t r i c t w h e r e d e p o s i tion is t a k e n . If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer
a question after being directed to do so by the court in the
district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure
may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) S a n c t i o n s b y c o u r t in w h i c h a c t i o n is p e n d i n g .
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery, including an order made
under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), ihe court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among others the
following:

(A) an order that the matters regarding which the
order was made or any other designated facts shall be
taken to be established for the purposes of the action
in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining
the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts
thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or anv
part thereof, or rendering a j u d g m e n t by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in
addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of
court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an
order under Rule 35(a) requiring him to produce
another for examination, such orders as are listed in
Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision,
unless the party failing to comply shows t h a t he is
unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to obey
the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was
substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
(c) E x p e n s e s o n f a i l u r e to a d m i t , if a party fails to admit
the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter as
requested under Rule 36, and if the party requesting the
admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document
or the t r u t h of the matter, he may apply to the court for an
order requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable
attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds
that (1) the request was held objectionable p u r s u a n t to Rule
36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial
importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable
ground to believe t h a t he might prevail on the matter, or (4)
there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
(d) F a i l u r e of p a r t y to a t t e n d a t o w n d e p o s i t i o n o r
s e r v e a n s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s or r e s p o n d t o r e q u e s t
for i n s p e c t i o n . If a party or an officer, director, or managing
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(bX6) or
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to a p p e a r before the
officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request
for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of
the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (bX2) of this rule. In lieu
of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances m a k e an award
of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be
excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a protective
order as provided by Rule 26(c).
(e) F a i l u r e to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e f r a m i n g of a discovery p l a n . If a party or his attorney fails to participate in good
faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is
required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for
hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other
p;:rty the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees. rMns«-d
by the failure.
Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application, or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
mdependent action
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER STRIKING "ANSWER TO
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE
OF DIVORCE", AND STRIKING
"COUNTER-PETITION", AND
GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANT

vs.
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT,

Case No. 904500236DA
Honorable James L Shumate

Defendant.

This matter having been presented to the Court pursuant to Defendant's "Motion
to Strike 'Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce', 'Counter-Petition', and for
Judgment", supported by the "Affidavit of Johnny Frank Wright" and by Defendant's
"Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 'Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce', 'Counter-Petition', and for Judgment", and the Court having reviewed the same,
and having noted that no opposition to said motion was filed by Plaintiff Paula Jean
Wright, and it clearly appearing from the Court's review of the files and records of this
case that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright has failed to respond to discovery propounded by

'0

^

Defendant, and that such failure on the part of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright has impeded
and frustrated the judicial process, in that it has hindered trial of this matter upon its
merits, and has made it impossible to determine the factual basis for any allegations
made by Plaintiff in her "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" and in her
"Counter-Petition", and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That Plaintiff's "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" in this

matter should be and it hereby is, stricken from the files and records of this case.
2.

That Plaintiff's "Counter-Petition" should be and it hereby is, stricken from

the files and records of this case.
3.

That the default of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright, with respect to Defendant's

"Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" should be and it hereby is, entered.
4.

That default judgment should be and it hereby is, entered in favor of

Defendant Johnny Frank Wright and against Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright, with respect to
Defendant's "Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce".
5.

That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and he hereby is, awarded

the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor child, Brandi Jean Wright, born
November 2, 1989, subject to visitation rights in Paula Jean Wright.

2
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6.

That the visitation rights of Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and hereby

are, decreed to include those set forth in the provisions of UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as
amended), provided, however, that such rights of visitation should be and hereby are,
made subject to the provision and requirement that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright not
remove Brandi Jean Wright from Iron County, Utah, without first obtaining written
permission of Defendant Johnny Frank Wright, or without first obtaining written orders
from this Court approving such removal for visitation.
7.

That any obligation of Defendant Johnny Frank Wright to pay child support

to Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and it hereby is, terminated.
8.

That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and he hereby is, awarded

child support, and that Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright should be and she hereby is, required
to pay child support, in accordance with the applicable guidelines now in effect, said
award of child support to be determined in accordance with applicable law, with the
assistance of the State of Utah, Department of Social Service, Office of Recovery
Services.
9.

That Defendant Johnny Frank Wright should be and hereby is, awarded his

costs of court and attorney fees incurred in connection with these proceedings, such
award to be evidenced by a subsequent "Judgment for Attorney Fees" to be granted to

3
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Johnny Frank Wright, upon Defendant Johnny Frank Wright furnishing an affidavit of his
costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with these proceedings, to this Court.
DATED this

day of April, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

:"&&

v<fAMES L SHUMATE

e?3,
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801)586-9483

BY
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,

)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT,

)
)

Defendant.

ORDER

Case No. 904500236DA
Honorable James L Shumate

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable James L.
Shumate, District Judge, pursuant to the Court's "Order for Expedited Hearing", in
connection with Plaintiff Paula Jean Wright's "Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment,
Motion for Stay, and Request for Expedited Hearing and Decision". Plaintiff Paula Jean
Wright, now "Tisdell", appeared personally and was represented by her attorney of
record, Mr. Floyd W. Holm. Defendant State of Utah, by and through the Utah State
Department of Social Services, appeared in the person of its attorney, Mr. Paul F. Graf,
Esq., Assistant Attorney General Defendant Johnny Frank Wright appeared personally,

3i7

and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.

The Court

reviewed the files and records of the case. Oral argument was had. the Court being
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Plaintiff's "Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment", and Plaintiff's "Motion for Stay"
should be and they hereby are, overruled and denied.
DATED this

5~

day oHdsy?1996.
BY THE COURT:
. *'

•:< ~

JAMES Li SHUMATE, District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM

•xy*\-3

65 fifeFLOYOW. HOLM
Attorney for Plaintiff PAULA JEAN TISDELL
(fqrmerly^WRIGHT)
/J
h

.LARDTl BISHOP
Attorney for Defendant JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT
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FLOYD W HOLM (1522)
965 South Main, Suite 3
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720
Telephone: (801)586-6532

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PAULA JEAN WRIGHT, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Plaintiff
vs.
JOHNNY FRANK WRIGHT,

]
;
]
]
>
]
]
i
)I

AFFIDAVrr OF PAULA J. TISDALE

Civil No. 904500236
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UlAtj

)
ss.
)

I, Paula J. Tisdale being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and say as follows:
1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and have personal knowledge

regarding the facts stated herein.
2.

In or about August, 1995 I was served with the pending Petition to Modify Decree
1
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of Divorce.
3.

I immediately obtained counsel to represent me, Mr. Michael W. Pari^andfiledan

Answer to the Petition and a Counter Petition on or about September 15,1995.
4.

Sometime after October 19,1995, my counsel mailed to me, Defendant's First Set

of Discovery Request to PlaintiflF, Paula Jean Wright Also, I received a copy of PlaintifPs First
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents that were served by counsel on
Defendant on or about October 30,1995. After receiving copies of those documents I did not
hear anything furtherfrommy counsel and, based on information I obtainedfromothers that
Defendant was having difficulty in his current marriage, I believed that the matter had been
dropped.
5.

In late January, 1996,1 received a Notice of Withdrawal of CounselfromMr.

Park and shortly thereafter received a Notice to Appoint Counsel or to Represent Self
6.

Again, nothing occurred in the case until early April, 1996 when I received

Defendant's Motion to Strike "Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce", and for
Judgment.
7.

Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Motion, I again contacted Mr. Park to

see if I could again obtain his assistance in the case. When I finally spoke to Mr. Park, he
advised me that he would require a retainer that I was unable to pay in order to re-enter his
appearance in the case and, suggested that 1 contact Utah Legal Services Corporation,
2
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8.
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I contacted Legal Services Corporation in Salt Lake City and after contacting

them was advised that since the case was pending in Washington County I should contact the
Cedar City Office of Legal Services,
9.

1finallycontacted the Cedar City office of Legal Services in mid April and on or

about April 24,1996 received a letter, dated April 18,1996fix>mUtah I^al Services, advising
me that, although I wasfinanciallyeligible for Legal Services, it could not handle my case. I
then immediately contacted Mr. Floyd W Holm who has now agreed to represent me.
10.

By the time Mr. Holm was able to review the case, this Court had already granted

the aforesaid motion and entered Judgment against me.
11.

The subject minor child is presently 6V% years of age and is enrolled in public

school, Kindergarten. She last had visitation with her father approximately one (1) year ago. I
believe it would be very traumatic if my daughter were removedfromschool and placed in the
custody of Defendant while my Motion to for RelieffromOrder and Judgment is pending.
DATED this 2-

day of May, 1996,

PAULAJ.HSBAfcfr T \ S D g f L L
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me thisC^

day of May, 1996.
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